Constitutional Law - Limitation of Powers of State Improvement Agencies by Phillips, Joseph F.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 23
Constitutional Law - Limitation of Powers of State
Improvement Agencies
Joseph F. Phillips
Copyright c 1962 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Joseph F. Phillips, Constitutional Law - Limitation of Powers of State Improvement Agencies, 3 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 532 (1962), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss2/23
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:516
THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION
Limitation of Powers of State Improvement Agencies
In Harrison v. Day, the State Comptroller challenged the
constitutionality of actions of the State Ports Authority. The
Authority had contracted with the Norfolk & Western Railway
to purchase property on which to construct new port facilities.
The Authority intended to develop these facilities and then
lease them to the Norfolk & Western Railway to operate in the
public interest. In order to initially finance the purchase and
construction, the Authority issued and sold revenue bonds. The
bonds were secured by a trust agreement and by a lease, which
contained a provision exempting the Railway from State taxes.
The State Comptroller questioned whether these intended
transactions by the Authority violated sections in the Virginia
Constitution prohibiting tax exemptions and State competition
with private enterprise. 2 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia held that the activities of a state agency performing proper
governmental functions are not rendered private functions by
the agency's leasing its facilities to an individual or corporation
for performance of the function involved.
Before the Constitution of 1902, the situation in the instant
case would have presented no legal question. Legislation passed
in 1896 gave the State power to lend or advance money to pri-
vate corporations which were engaged in works of public im-
provement. The Legislature passed this act feeling that such a
policy would facilitate commercial development in Virginia.
The impracticality of this legislation readily manifested it-
self, however, when many of the corporations receiving such aid
quickly proved themselves bad risks.3 Because of the losses
1 Harrison v. Day, 202 Va. 967, 121 S.E.2d 615 (1961).
2VA. CONST. § 185:
Neither the credit of the State, nor of any county, city or town,
shall be, directly or indirectly, under any devise or pretense whatsoever,
granted to the aid of any person, association, or corporation, nor shall
the State, or any county, city or town subscribe to or become interested
in the stock or obligations of any company, association or corporation,
for the purpose of aiding in the construction or maintenance of its work;
nor shall the State become a party to or become interested in any work
of internal improvement, except public roads and public parks . .
3 Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 91 S.E.2d 660 (1956).
CASE COMMENTS
experienced by the State, the Legislature revised part of the old
Constitution by inserting the limitations which now appear in
Section 185.4
In order to soften the rather stringent restrictions of Section
185, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia began to con-
sider whether works of internal improvement satisfied a govern-
mental purpose or merely a private purpose. The following
cases show how this "governmental purpose" doctrine has been
applied.
Perhaps the most obvious application of this doctrine
appears in Almond v. Gilmer, where the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals held that State operation of a ferry fulfilled a valid govern-
mental purpose because one may consider a ferry an extension
of a highway. - Since Section 185 expressly makes State main-
tenance of highways legal, it follows that State operation of
a ferry---a mere extension of the highway-constitutes a valid
governmental purpose.
Almond v. Day6 discussed the application and theory of the
doctrine more explicitly. The Board of Trustees of the Virginia
Supplemental Retirement System wished to invest funds under
its control in securities for the State's benefit. The Court held
that the "animating purpose" and the object a State Agency
sought to accomplish were the necessary factors to consider in
judging the constitutionality of the transaction in view of
Section 185.
The Court also stated that if State funds were used to pur-
chase securities for State purposes it would not matter whether a
private corporation or an individual benefitted from the trans-
action. This case seems to state the more general policy upon
which all cases of that sort have been decided. For example,
operation of shuttle busses through the Elizabeth River Tunnel7
and the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel8 were declared valid
4 Ibid.
5 Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822, 51 S.E.2d 277 (1949).
6 Almond v. Day, supra note 3.
7Elizabeth River Tunnel District v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 117 S.E.2d
685 (1961).
8 Almond v. Day, supra note 3.
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activities of the State because the service was incidental to the
State highway system and therefore was "incidental and neces-
sary to the performance of the State's governmental func-
tions." 9
In Harrison v. Day, 0 the Supreme Court declared the State
Ports Authority's development of harbor facilities at Hampton
Roads a valid governmental purpose. The Court held that the
internal improvement provisions in the Constitution were not
intended to limit State development only to those functions
"that are inherent and necessary to the government and without
which it cannot be maintained."" The government, in addi-
tion to providing such improvements as these may foster such
activities as provide for the welfare and prosperity of its people.
Shenandoah Lime Co. v. Governor 12 seems to show the appli-
cation of the governmental purpose doctrine in its most
distinct sense. The State wished to operate lime-grinding
facilities in order to provide useful labor for its convicts. The
Supreme Court held such action to be constitutional, pro-
claiming the development and operation of such facilities
incidental to the performance of a governmental function. The
striking difference between this case and other cases of its kind
is that the internal improvements in the other cases were for the
direct benefit of the general public.
One may discern from these cases three basic criteria which
appear to form the foundation of the "governmental purpose"
doctrine as the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has applied
it. The Court seems to consider developments as fulfilling a
valid governmental purpose (1) when they constitute a mere
extension of something which has been previously erected in
the fulfillment of a governmental purpose, (2) when they are
incidental to a government function, and (3) when they are for
the prosperity and welfare of the public. Harrison v. Day seems
to fall most easily into the third category. It differs from cases
previous to it only in that it is more liberal in permitting ob-
vious benefits to a private corporation.
J.F.P.
9 ibid.
10 Harrison v. Day, supra note 1.
11 Id. at 775.
12 Shenandoah Lime Co. v. Governor, 115 Va. 865, 80 S.E. 753 (1913).
